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the prosecutor's ethical duty to seek and exercise
discretion in seeking reasonable dispositions in
cases.
The Interests of Victims. A children's advocacy
group weighed in against the bonus plan based on
fear that prosecutors would force abused children
to testify at trials in cases that could have been
resolved through negotiated gu ilty pleas. This
concern highl ights the interest a crime victim may
have in resolving a criminal case without trial to
avoid the possible trauma of being a witness.
Efficient Use of Resources. Encouraging prosecutors to take more cases to trial will also put
greater demands on the resources of the prosecutor's office, the police, and the court system, resources that many view as already overextended.
In a world of limited resources, using more resources to try cases ultimately means that fewer
worthy cases can be pursued.
Misconduct. The prohibition against defense
contingent fees in criminal cases is rooted in a
concern that they would tempt the defense lawyer to engage in illegal and unethical conduct to
secure an acquittal. The same argument may be
advanced regarding prosecutors. Rewards such as
those that would arise under Plans 1 and 2 might
induce some prosecutors to engage in misconduct,
such as withholding Brady material or introduc-.
ing questionable evidence. Many critics of current ·
prosecutorial practices believe that prosecutors
are already too concerned about conviction track
records, leading to misconduct If a prosecutor
engages in unethical behavior, the prosecutor will
be rewarded under contingent reward plans long
before the case is likely to be reversed on appeal.
Symmetry. Finally, one can make an argument
based on symmetry. Model Rule 1.5 prohibits the
defense lawyer from taking a case on a contingent fee. One can argue, then, th at simple fairness
mandates a similar prohibition should apply to
the prosecutor.

Arguments in Fav'?r qf Rewards for
Convictions
· ·
Positive Incentives. All attorney fees, whether
hourly, flat, or contingent, create both positive
and perverse incentives for lawyers. Contingent
rewards for prosecutors similarly create both
good and bad incentives. For example, an incentive structure that encourages prosecutors to try
more cases reduces the temptation to overcharge
a defendant at the outset of a case in order to gain
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bargaining leverage. The greater the likelihood a
prosecutor will have to prove charges at trial beyond reasonable doubt, the less the likelihood the
prosecutor will add charges unsupported by the
evidence.
A contin gent reward system could also help
motivate lazy or underachieving prosecutors.
The incentives such a system creates could motivate the "underzealous" prosecutor- the one
who wants to leave work every day at 4: 30 p.m.
and won't take cases other than "slam dunks"
that lead to guilty pleas and involve little work.
In other words, like any bonus system contingent
rewards motivate employees to work harder.
Perverse incentives are inherent in all fee and
salary arrangements. Rather than looking only
at perverse incentives when deciding whether to
ban a particular fee or reward arrangement, we
should assess both its perverse and positive incentives before making such a judgment. The same is
true for contingent fees and rewards for prosecutors. We should ask whether the risks in bonus
or prize plans are significantly greater or significantly less justifiable than other fee arrangements
such as hourly fees for civil lawyers or flat fees for
criminal defense lawyers.
A Convenient Benchmark. While admittedly
not precise measures of productivity, conviction
rates at trial are easy to determine and send clear
signals, factors that may be important in prosecutor offices that are too overburdened to provide
more insightful supervision and feedback. A Colorado district attorney, for example, explained
that performance bonuses advanced the goals of
her office- trying cases and getting convictions.
She said that it was hard to find performance
measures for trial attorneys, and that these were
ones that the lawyers in her office know and can
target.
Trial SkiUs. Incentives based on convictions
will likely increase the number of cases prosecutors try. Regularly trying cases could help maintain and enhance the overall trial skills of the lawyers in the office by providing trial experience and
by encouraging prosecutors to work on their trial
skills through courses and study.
Symmetry. In response to the symmetry argument described above, that contingent fees and
incentives should be banned for prosecutors because contingent fees are banned for criminal defense lawyers, one might argue that the prohibition
of contingent fees in criminal cases-whether for
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hi t~ rorbtl accident, <tr.Jd u c-a rry~()v.:-r fn)m a tim~
when an ~:omingcul fees \1-'Ct'C su.;pecr. Whik cor.lingenl t\..-e3 in ci\'il .:•.ts~~ beca me nu>rc aa:epkd
by th~ early part o f lht) ~Oth century, there w a~
lingering susp idon that conting:::rlL fee~ in criminal cases co'Uld have a corruptjng intlu~n~.-:c. \\.Volfrom points LHtt that tl·11.:re is no ro.::ason t O view the
criminal
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bar as more susceptible to the

.::ormpting in·11uencc o f contingent lees than civil
litigators. (CHARLES \V WotFR ~~, !vtool:'R~ Lr.:0.\L
E'rH1cs § 9.4. ~ (19%). ) (f lhere i!' in:mfficknt
justification tor banuing ~on ri ngent fees tor lhe
defense, one might argue that we should abando11
that harl rather than extending it to prost.'l::tltors.
Conclusion
On balance we agree with the Reslatemrmr's position that contingent f~es should be banned f()r
prosecutors. Similarly, we think that t he better

view is that rc\v(.!rds tlw prosecutors contingent
on trial convictions are unsound.
The decision whether to otTer a negotiated
guilty plea or take a case to trial is a wmplicated
and nuanced. question with many vatiables. The
reward systems in both p.!an ~ described at the
outset of this column are based on the assumption that negotiated guilty pleas are always bad
a nd alway:; involve inappropriate discounting of
charges or sentences. T his is no1 a valid general
assumption. The monetary rewards created by
these incentive systems overly simplify what i:;
and sh01.dd be treated as a complicated and m1-
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Second, we. hdil:'\'e tbal there i~ iusutikic;H
justiiic~nion for the ri-;b ~nch ~.xm ringcnl ~<:ward:\
c:catc. At conlmon law. con1!ngent f(:es \\:ere twt
tnh!rati.:d in :.-itl1~r the dvil or criminal cou.rcxt.
Eventu~tlly a!J juri~dktion~ rejected that appr~:acb
in civil G«:>es <) t\ the ground of neces-;ity, reasoning. thm witho ut. conttngem f~C$ :x)or persons
with mcritori~1us claims wonlJ he denied acces8
to th~ (Ourts becau:ic th~y wen~ too poor tu p.ay

c::ounscL In sum, tbe acceptance of CClntingent
Ice:; iu the ch·i l cont~xt is sopponcd by th~t.~ powert'ul justifi.carion that it prMl1l'le.;; acces:> to \:0Unse1
for lht)::iC who oth..:nvise c.a nnot affbrd to retain
coun::;el. There is no such justificutiun when the
government pays the prose.cmor.
In addirjon, there are ways to rncntor and
mon itor prosecutors that arc t~u· prderable to relying simply on lhe number or rate of trial convk·tions. Case file revi~ws, guilty plea. reviews, a nd
observing prosec.:utors i11 hearings and trials are
more precise ways to evaluate and mentor prose~mors. These methods for assessing performance
are more nuanced and fine-tuned than triul and
conviction ra.tes, whkh seem very c.rudc proxies
for the qualilie!l we seek in prosecutors.
When good performance is reduced to the percentage of wins in a specified number of trials,
the im:ent ive strucrure fails to recognize that winning or losing a case is not solely dependcu t on
the prosecutur's performance. The outcome of a
case depends on the quality of evidence, the work
of the police invesligaring t he case, and how witnesses Jo on the stand. Win-loss records fail to
take account of such factors. •

